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APPROVED FOR RELEASE ☐ DATE:

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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John E. Koehler  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT : American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia (U)

Per your request the attached data relative to the above subject in support of your testimony before the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December 1981 is provided for your information. The package consists of individual inputs from the Imagery, SIGINT and HUMINT Offices plus a compilation of talking points for your use. Also provided is a working draft of the DIA prepared testimony statement which will be presented by RADM Burkhalter. Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance in this matter.

  
John E. Koehler

Attachment:










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**SUBJECT:** American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Clinton H. Winne, Jr., USAF  
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff


FROM : Harry C. Eisenbeiss  
Director, Office of Imagery Collection and Exploitation


SUBJECT : American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia



1. The following is provided in support of Admiral Inman's appearance before the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December.

IMAGERY:

2. The DIA is the executive agent for stating imagery collection requirements in response to the POW/MIA problem and for exploiting such imagery. RADM Paulson, DC, is the senior DIA officer responsible for MIA/POW matters. DIA is also responding to the House request and Admiral Burkhalter, Deputy Director, will present DIA testimony. For the most part, imagery requirements are generated in an effort to confirm/negate reports from HUMINT sources. These imagery requirements can be categorized as either area search or surveillance depending on the specifics of the information available. Area search is employed whenever a source provides only a general location of a possible POW camp. Surveillance coverage is used to monitor known facilities that are suspected to house POWs/MIAs. DIA performs primary imagery exploitation against this problem. NPIC does not do detailed exploitation, but would provide initial readout of any significant finds relative to this subject. (See DIA imagery report on a suspect POW detention facility at Attachment 3.) OIA supports any



3. Historically, this imagery requirement has been fairly small in number. For example, in 1981 only about nine requirements have been identified and only six facilities are presently active for imagery collection. There are no special area search requirements currently identified for collection, although Vietnam and Laos have standing  requirements requiring complete

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**SUBJECT: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia**

search coverage on a periodic basis. The Intelligence Community is very sensitive to the importance of this problem. These requirements receive whatever collection priority is required to meet imagery needs. The primary factor affecting requirement satisfaction is the adverse weather conditions that are prevalent in this region throughout most of the year and the requirement for very high resolution imagery to accomplish the detailed readout required. Attachment 1 summarizes requirements that were identified during 1981 and the coverage acquired during the specified collection period. Attachment 2 summarizes [redacted] coverage of Vietnam and Laos acquired by the two most recent KH-9 missions.

4. Inputs from D/OSC (Attachment 4), D/OHC (Attachment 5), DDO (Attachment 6), working draft of the DIA testimony (Attachment 7), and talking points (Attachment 8) are attached as indicated.

[redacted]  
Harry G. Eisenberg


**Attachments:**

- 1 - Recent Collection Reqmts. and Coverage Accomplishments
- 2 - [redacted] of Vietnam and Laos
- 3 - DIA Imagery Report
- 4 - OSC Input
- 5 - OHC Input
- 6 - DDO Input
- 7 - DIA Draft Testimony Statement
- 8 - Talking Points

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Recent Collection Requirements and Coverage Accomplishments



A large rectangular box, likely a placeholder for a figure or table. Inside this box, there are three smaller, empty rectangular boxes: one in the lower-left quadrant, one in the lower-right quadrant, and one in the upper-right quadrant.An empty rectangular box, likely a placeholder for a signature or additional information.

ATTACHMENT 2

 Coverage

of

Vietnam and Laos



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ATTACHMENT 3 to

IMAGERY ANALYSIS NOTES

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Attachment 4 to [REDACTED]

1 DEC 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry C. Eisenbeiss  
Director, Office of Imagery Collection & Exploitation

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Director, Office of SIGINT Collection

SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

REFERENCE: DD/ICS Note, Same Subject dated 27 Nov 1981

1. In response to the above reference the following information is provided.

a. SIGINT collection requirements levied against the POW/MIA problem.

Currently there are three active requirements in the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) which request information on POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. [REDACTED]

b. Evaluation of SIGINT Efforts.


The following evaluation of the results of NSA's SIGINT efforts to date was provided by [REDACTED] Chief, B5 NSA. B5 is the focal point in NSA for all actions connected with the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue.


(1) To date there has been no SIGINT information either substantiating or refuting the existence of unaccounted for U.S. POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. NSA, however, continues to task available collection resources against NSRL requirements concerning POW/MIA information.


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~~TOP SECRET~~**SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia**

2. The DDCI in his previous capacity as DIRNSA was aware of all NSA initiatives with regard to U.S. POW/MIAs. NSA B5 is not optimistic that SIGINT will be able to contribute information on this issue. 




**Attachments**  
**a/s**

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
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
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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM TO Director, Office of Imagery, Collection  
and ExploitationFROM: 

Director, Office of HUMINT Collection

SUBJECT:

HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem  
in Southeast Asia

1. National concerns and priorities regarding POW/MIAs are reflected in the National HUMINT Collection Plan #34 on Indochina, issued in March 1981. HUMINT collection responsibilities for objectives on the subject as it relates to Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos are assigned to State (advisory), the CIA's clandestine service and DIA, with supporting responsibilities for the military services, DCD and FBIS.

2. HUMINT collection which has been productive on POW/MIAs has been primarily from debriefing of refugees from Vietnam  information in the Vietnamese media.

3. 

although queried, have no knowledge of this subject. As a result, the reporting on POW/MIAs from debriefings is meager. In the case of DoD, the debriefing and reporting is done by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, whose entre to refugee camps is on humanitarian grounds. FBIS gives the subject a very high priority; however, reporting has been limited to material from the Vietnamese media, almost all of which is general and reactive to U.S. commentary.

4. In sum, HUMINT collection managers and field entities are fully aware of the importance of the POW/MIA issue and are attempting to improve collection. Collection opportunities, however, have been scarce.

  
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**SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem  
in Southeast Asia**

**Distribution:**

Orig. - Addressee  
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~~SECRET~~Attachment 6 to **EAST ASIA DIVISION COMMENTS****I. What is the priority of the POW/MIA issue at CIA?**

No CIA Station is tasked in its OD with action on the MIA/POW issue.

When any believable information on POW/MIA's is obtained in the field, the highest priority is assigned to its verification.

**II. What are the resources being assigned to this problem within CIA?**

At CIA Headquarters there is no DDO officer who has been specifically assigned to the POW/MIA problem.

As mentioned above, officers at all stations are alert for any information on POW/MIA's.

**III. What are the roadblocks to resolving this issue? How can these barriers be eliminated?**

The primary roadblock to resolving this issue continues to be the uncooperative attitude of the governments of Vietnam and Laos. They claim they have no POW's and are searching for MIA's.

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Repeated requests over the years by the U.S. Government for more information or entry into these countries of investigative teams have been stalled. Continued diplomatic efforts combined with intelligence community efforts to obtain positive information appear to be the best available course of action at this time.

Unfortunately, another and serious roadblock to obtaining positive information on the subject is the publicity given to leaks of confidential activities, and publicity given to the wild and inaccurate stories of various adventurers.

As a result of publicity, many Lao and Vietnamese believe that claiming to possess information on POW/MIA's is a way to ensure entry to the United States, various Indochinese resistance groups view it as a method of obtaining covert U.S. Government financial and military support, and professional fabricators see it as a way of obtaining funds. The continued visits to Thailand of various soldiers of fortune working on their own or on behalf of private groups serves to additionally confuse the issue. Considerable intelligence community time and effort is wasted on the stories of fabricators and soldiers of fortune. Also, the actions of adventurers and inaccurate publicity has undoubtedly caused the Vietnamese and Lao to tighten security and to become more intransigent in their attitude towards our diplomatic efforts.

IV. Has the United States intelligence community achieved smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?

We believe there is good cooperation among the members of the intelligence community both at the Headquarters level and in the field. DIA is recognized as the focal point for all POW/MIA information and CIA passes all information obtained on the subject to DIA.

We believe DIA is doing an excellent job in this difficult activity and will continue to cooperate fully.

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VI. What more can the United States Government do to assist the intelligence community on this issue?

Sufficient support and cooperation is being provided at this time. We know that if additional resources are necessary that the administration will be responsive to any requests. The problem is not one of resources or even intelligence, especially in the case of alleged POW's. It has not been demonstrated, at least on the basis of the considerable available information, that additional collection resources would lead to a definitive resolution of this issue. Sufficient assets are in place and a large volume of information is continually being screened and checked. To date, information indicating locations of POW's and MIA's in Laos or Vietnam has not proved credible. We and DIA have gone to considerable lengths to check out the more promising leads.

VII. What more can the United States intelligence community do on this issue?

The intelligence community continues to be alert and receptive to any information concerning POW/MIA's. We will actively and aggressively continue to search for, and follow up on new sources of information.

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Attachment 7 to

Statement of

RADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN

Deputy Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

on

Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

Before the

Task Force on American Prisoners

and Missing in Southeast Asia

House Subcommittee

on

Asian and Pacific Affairs

December 8, 1981

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND HONORABLE MEMBERS:

DUE TO PRIOR COMMITMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF TOWN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES WILLIAMS, HAS ASKED ME TO APPEAR BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TODAY AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY ON THE SUBJECT OF DIA'S INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION AND COME BEFORE YOU ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. THE TASK FORCE'S VIGOROUS EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD DETERMINING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS LISTED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AND WHO STILL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IS WELL RECOGNIZED BY DIA. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE TASK FORCE IS WELL AWARE OF DIA'S ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

IN THAT REGARD, I DO WANT TO REAFFIRM DIA'S FULL COOPERATION WITH YOU IN THIS MATTER. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE CRITICAL NEED FOR CONTINUED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IS RECOGNIZED AND I ASSURE YOU THAT DIA WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT NEEDED FOR AS LONG AS AMERICANS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. RADM JERRY PAULSON, WITH WHOM YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IS THE ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND HEADS OUR PW/MIA STAFF.

LIKE MOST MILITARY MEN, MY PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH MEN WHO ARE NOW AMONG THE MISSING HAS KEPT ME CLOSE TO THE ISSUE FOR MANY YEARS. AS PART OF DIA'S COMMAND ELEMENT I FOLLOW THIS AGENCY'S EVERY DAY EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE THROUGH A DAILY REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR. I CAN SAY WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT DIA REMAINS DEDICATED IN ITS PURSUIT AND RESEARCH OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESENT FATE OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS. ASSUREDLY, THE PW/MIA FUNCTION HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE STRONG COMMAND ATTENTION WITHIN DIA.

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AFTER HAVING SAID THAT OUR EFFORTS CONTINUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, ADD, AND REGRETTABLY SO, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SITUATION SINCE DIA'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF SIX MONTHS AGO. THERE ARE STILL 2,496 AMERICANS WHO WERE DETERMINED TO BE EITHER A PRISONER, MISSING OR KILLED (BODY NOT RECOVERED) THAT REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE HAVE STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT DIA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF AN INDIVIDUAL STATUS. OUR GOAL IS TO RECOVER ANY AMERICAN - WHETHER LIVE OR DEAD. OUR COLLECTION AND RESEARCH EFFORTS RELATIVE TO REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REFLECT OUR DEDICATION TO THAT END.

UNDERSTANDABLY, THE REFUGEE REPORTING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUES TO BE OUR MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1975 WE HAVE ACQUIRED A TOTAL OF 1,303 <sup>FIRST HAND</sup> REPORTS BEARING ON THE PW/MIA PROBLEM. OF THE TOTAL REPORTING, 386 ARE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 33 PERCENT OF THESE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS HAVE BEEN EQUATED TO AMERICANS WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT USING A SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL APPROACH, THAT AN ADDITIONAL <sup>10</sup> PERCENT OF THE SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD EQUATE TO ACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. SOME OF THE REMAINING SIGHTING REPORTS ARE FABRICATIONS AND OTHERS ARE REPORTS FROM PERHAPS WELL INTENDED BUT MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS. THERE ARE OTHER SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY INVESTIGATED AND OTHERS, FOR WHICH OUR FOLLOW UP EFFORTS CONTINUE. DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND OUR PERSISTENT EFFORTS, WE STILL CAN NOT PROVE THAT THERE ARE ANY AMERICANS BEING DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.

AS A CASE IN POINT, WE HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ONE OF OUR RECENT LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 165 MANDAYS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED IN HOPEFUL PURSUIT OF THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE SOURCE'S INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEWS, INVESTIGATIONS, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS AND ANALYTICAL RESEARCH COVERED A PERIOD BACK TO 1954,

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AND INVOLVED A NUMBER OF AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES.

AFTER THIS THOROUGH EXAMINATION ARE WE NOW SATISFIED THAT THIS SOURCE HAS BEEN DECEPTIVE AND UNTRUTHFUL.

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS DIA HAS TAKEN EVER INCREASING STEPS TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.

DIA'S PW/MIA STAFF IS CURRENTLY AT A MANNING LEVEL OF 15 PERSONNEL. THE STAFF HAS ADDED PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE, AND WITH EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUNDS. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE STAFF RELATIVE TO ANALYTICAL SKILLS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN BACKGROUND INCLUDING INCOUNTRY EXPERIENCE IS EXCEPTIONAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE REGULARLY ASSISTED IN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, PHOTO INTERPRETERS, LINGUISTS, INVESTIGATORY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS ON A WORLD WIDE BASIS. NO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON RESEARCH, INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S PURSUIT OF PW/MIA INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL ALLOCATIONS REMAIN AUSTERE FOR OTHER PURPOSES, THIS SAME POLICY OF NO CONSTRAINTS APPLIES TO TRAVEL FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S QUICK REACTION TEAM WHICH TRAVELS WITHIN CONUS AND OVERSEAS TO INTERVIEW SOURCES OF POTENTIAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEEMED ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFORTS. OUR WORKING RELATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY IS THE COOPERATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER PERSONNEL TO OUR TASKING AND FOLLOW-UP REQUIREMENTS RELATIVE TO REFUGEE INTERVIEWS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING EXISTS ON VARIOUS ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS, DIA RECENTLY BROUGHT THE JCRC BANGKOK LIAISON OFFICER TO WASHINGTON FOR EXTENSIVE WORKING DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, THROUGH DIA INITIATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OBTAINED AUTHORIZATION FOR JCRC PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT PW/MIA INTERVIEWS WITH

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VETERAN REFUGEES IN HONG KONG AND MACAO. THE JOINT ROLE IN THE DEBRIEFINGS HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEIR PROFESSIONALISM GREATLY FACILITATES OUR ANALYTICAL EFFORTS.

DIA PROVIDES THE INTELLIGENCE UPON WHICH DECISIONMAKERS DEVELOP U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK FORCE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS THROUGH INFORMAL CLOSED SESSION BRIEFINGS. WHEN OUR RESEARCH HAS DEVELOPED INFORMATION TO A POINT THAT FURTHER PURSUIT WARRANTS ACTION BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OR CHARTER OF DIA THEN AT THAT POINT ACTION IS TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY. ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THIS MANNER WOULD BE PROVIDED TO DIA FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION. I THINK IT WORTHWHILE AT THIS POINT TO NOTE AGAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE CLASSIFIED AND REMAIN SO IF OUR EFFORTS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE AND ALSO TO PRECLUDE HARM TO ANY AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE HELD IN CAPTIVITY. SINCE PFC ROBERT GARWOOD, USMC, RETURNED FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, DIA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE MARINE CORPS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CASE. ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED FROM DEBRIEFING GARWOOD DUE TO HIS COURT MARTIAL, DIA DID HAVE ACCESS TO PW/MIA INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE MARINE CORPS, AND BY THE FORMER CHAIRMAN AND A PRESENT MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 1979. THE MARINE CORPS RECENTLY ADVISED DIA THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF GARWOOD'S COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THEY HAD NO FURTHER RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD. A LETTER HAS BEEN SENT FROM DIA TO GARWOOD'S COUNSEL REQUESTING HIS COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GARWOOD INTERVIEW DEDICATED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF RESOLVING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

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THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENTIAL ON THE PW/MIA ISSUE. DURING PREVIOUS TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS SUBCOMMITTEE, DIA REPORTED THAT IT HAD JUDGED AS VALID A FORMER VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST'S INFORMATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS IN ITS POSSESSION THE REMAINS OF SOME 400 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LOST AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA. THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE CONFRONTED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HANOI. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE REMAINS. IN OUR TESTIMONY IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR IT WAS NOTED THAT THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE REMAINS OF THREE ADDITIONAL MISSING AMERICANS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE RETURN OF THESE REMAINS WERE WELCOMED, AND IN A LARGER SENSE, IT WAS A CYNICAL REFLECTION ON THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE. THESE REMAINS HAVE SINCE BEEN RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED AS BEING THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDER EFFORTS. IN PARTICULAR, THESE CASES WERE THREE OF FOUR INCLUDED IN MEETINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE JUST PRIOR TO AND AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE EVENT OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETURN OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR LOSS, VARIED YEARS OF LOSS, AND CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWING THEIR LOSS, CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT JUST RECOVER THESE INDIVIDUALS ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDERS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL SMALL GAINS, THE OVERALL ISSUE OF AN ACCOUNTING REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNACCOMPLISHED. RECENT PROPOSALS TO THE VIETNAMESE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE PW/MIA MEETINGS IN HANOI THIS PAST FALL AND A RECIPROCAL PW/MIA VISIT TO HAWAII, WERE DEFERRED BY THE VIETNAMESE. A VERY RECENT PROPOSAL FOR A STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL PW/MIA MISSION TO VISIT VIENTIANE WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE LAOTIANS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE

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THE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE STATE/DOD JOINTLY  
HANOI. THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TYPICAL OF THEIR  
ATTITUDE OVER THE YEARS. THEREIN LIES THE ROADBLOCK TO ACHIEVING AN  
ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING.

THE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DIA'S EFFORTS AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BY THE TASK  
FORCE AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN MOST  
ASSURING AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE CALLED UPON SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. AT  
PRESENT IT IS FELT THAT ACTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE,  
COUPLED WITH THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE  
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC  
CHANNELS IS OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING OF OUR  
MISSING MEN. FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE RESTS WITH THE INFORMATION HELD  
BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT IN THE INFORMATION HELD BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.  
IN SPITE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE, IT  
IS DIA'S INTENT AND DUTY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND  
FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

DIA HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICANS WHO  
MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A  
DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORT TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS  
MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW DIA'S RESOLVE IS UNWAVERING. LIEUTENANT  
GENERAL WILLIAMS, MYSELF, RADM PAULSON AND HIS STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO  
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH YOUR TASK FORCE.

DRAFT

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~~TOP SECRET~~Attachment 8 to American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

-- Intelligence Community very sensitive to the importance of POW/MIA problem.

-- Imagery, SIGINT and human resources have been tasked to collect information on this problem.

-- Imagery - generated in an effort to confirm or negate reports from HUMINT sources. Over 900  operations to date in 1981.

-- Imagery search is employed whenever a source provides a general location of possible POW camp. Surveillance coverage is used to monitor known facilities that are suspected to house POWs.

-- Requirements receive whatever priority is required to meet the imagery need.

-- Imagery hampered by adverse weather prevalent throughout most of the year and the requirement for very high resolution imagery.

-- In 1981, only nine requirements identified for imagery collection and only six facilities are presently active for imagery collection.

-- SIGINT - Currently, three active requirements in National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL).

-- To date, there has been no SIGINT information either substantiating or refuting the existence of POWs/MIAs in Southeast Asia.

-- HUMINT - Collection responsibilities for POW/MIA problem have been levied on State, CIA's clandestine service and DIA with support from DCD and FBIS.

-- HUMINT collection which has been productive primarily derived from debriefing of refugees  and Vietnam.

-- Some HUMINT information has been derived from Vietnamese media.

-- Continued diplomatic efforts, combined with Intelligence Community attempts to obtain positive information, appear to be best course of action at this time.

-- Need to control leaks of classified activities against the problem and limit the publicity given to independent actions by private groups.

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